Abduction for (non-ominiscient) agents

Among the non-monotonic reasoning processes, abduction is one of the most important. Usually described as the process of looking florexplantions, it has been recognized as one of the most commonly used in our daily activities. Still, the traditional definitions of an abductive problem and an abductive solution mention only theories and formulas, leaving agency out of the picture. Our work proposes a study of abductive reasoning from an epistemic and dynamic perspective, making special emphasis on non-ideal agents. We begin by exploring what an abductive problema is in terms of an agent’s information, and what an abductive solution is in terms of the actions that modify it. Then we explore the different kinds of abductive problems and abductive solutions that arise when we consider agents whose information is not closed under logical consequence, and agents whose reasoning abilities are not complete

Communication between agents in dynamic epistemic logic

This manuscript studies actions of communication between epistemic logic agents. It starts by looking into actions through which all/some agents share all their information, defining the model operation that transforms the model, discussing its properties, introducing a modality for describing it and providing an axiom system for the latter. The main part of the manuscript focuses on an action through which some agents share part of their information: they share all that they know about a topic defined by a given formula. Once again, the manuscript defines the model operation that transforms the model, discusses its properties, introduces a modality for describing it and provides an axiom system for the latter

Argument-based Belief in Topological Structures

This paper combines two studies: a topological semantics for epistemic notions and abstract argumentation theory. In our combined setting, we use a topological semantics to represent the structure of an agent's collection of evidence, and we use argumentation theory to single out the relevant sets of evidence through which a notion of beliefs grounded on arguments is defined. We discuss the formal properties of this newly defined notion, providing also a formal language with a matching modality together with a sound and complete axiom system for it. Despite the fact that our agent can combine her evidence in a 'rational' way (captured via the topological structure), argument-based beliefs are not closed under conjunction. This illustrates the difference between an agent's reasoning abilities (i.e. the way she is able to combine her available evidence) and the closure properties of her beliefs. We use this point to argue for why the failure of closure under conjunction of belief should not bear the burden of the failure of rationality.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825

A formal model for explicit knowledge as awareness of plus awareness that

Since the problem of logical omniscience was identified, several proposals have tried to model the knowledge of ‘real’ agents with limited reasoning abilities. One of the most important proposals, awareness logic, relies on the concept of awareness in order to distinguish what the agent ‘truly’ knows and what she could get out of it. Still, the notion of awareness can be interpreted in different ways: it can be understood as what the agent simply entertains, without having any attitude in favour or against (awareness of), but also as what she has consciously recognised as true (awareness that). A previous proposal introduced a combination of these two possible interpretations at a conceptual level. This presentation proposes a formal framework (a semantic model and a language to describe it) that captures these two interpretations of the notion of awareness, as well as the epistemic notions that arise from their combination, such as implicit knowledge, explicit knowledge or justification. The framework provides tools not only for understanding the notions’ subtle interaction, but also for representing some of the different epistemic actions (deductive inference, changes in awareness, external communication) that affect them.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech

Logic of Justified Beliefs Based on Argumentation

This manuscript presents a topological argumentation framework for modelling notions of evidence-based (i.e., justified) belief. Our framework relies on so-called topological evidence models to represent the pieces of evidence that an agent has at her disposal, and it uses abstract argumentation theory to select the pieces of evidence that the agent will use to define her beliefs. The tools from abstract argumentation theory allow us to model agents who make decisions in the presence of contradictory information. Thanks to this, it is possible to define two new notions of beliefs, grounded beliefs and fully grounded beliefs. These notions are discussed in this paper, analysed and compared with the existing notion of topological justified belief. This comparison revolves around three main issues: closure under conjunction introduction, the level of consistency and their logical strength.acceptedVersio

Forgetting complex propositions

This paper uses possible-world semantics to model the changes that may occur in an agent's knowledge as she loses information. This builds on previous work in which the agent may forget the truth-value of an atomic proposition, to a more general case where she may forget the truth-value of a propositional formula. The generalization poses some challenges, since in order to forget whether a complex proposition $\pi$ is the case, the agent must also lose information about the propositional atoms that appear in it, and there is no unambiguous way to go about this. We resolve this situation by considering expressions of the form $[\boldsymbol{\ddagger} \pi]\varphi$, which quantify over all possible (but minimal) ways of forgetting whether $\pi$. Propositional atoms are modified non-deterministically, although uniformly, in all possible worlds. We then represent this within action model logic in order to give a sound and complete axiomatization for a logic with knowledge and forgetting. Finally, some variants are discussed, such as when an agent forgets $\pi$ (rather than forgets whether $\pi$) and when the modification of atomic facts is done non-uniformly throughout the model

An Abstract Look at Awareness Models and Their Dynamics

This work builds upon a well-established research tradition on modal logics of awareness. One of its aims is to export tools and techniques to other areas within modal logic. To this end, we illustrate a number of significant bridges with abstract argumentation, justification logics, the epistemic logic of knowing-what and deontic logic, where basic notions and definitional concepts can be expressed in terms of the awareness operator combined with the box modality. Furthermore, these conceptual links point to interesting properties of awareness sets beyond those standardly assumed in awareness logics, i.e. positive and negative introspection. We show that the properties we list are characterised by corresponding canonical formulas, so as to obtain a series of off-the-shelf axiomatisations for them. As a second focus, we investigate the general dynamics of this framework by means of event models. Of specific interest in this context is to know under which conditions, given a model that satisfies some property, the update with an event model keeps it within the intended class. This is known as the closure problem in general dynamic epistemic logics. As a main contribution, we prove a number of closure theorems providing sufficient conditions for the preservation of our properties. Again, these results enable us to axiomatize our dynamic logics by means of reduction axioms.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2023, arXiv:2307.0400

Tuning the program transformers from LCC to PDL

ISBN del número: 978-1-84890-274-9This work proposes an alternative definition of the so-called program transformers used to obtain reduction axioms in the Logic of Communication and Change (LCC). Our proposal uses an elegant matrix treatment of Brzozowski’s equational method instead of Kleene’s translation from finite automata to regular expressions. The two alternatives are shown to be equivalent, with Brzozowski’s method having the advantage of generating smaller expressions for models with average connectivity